Revell 04736 Space Shuttle Discovery & Booster Rockets 1:144 Scale Unbuilt/Unpainted Plastic Model Kit, Multi-color, 59.5 x 36.4 x 6.5 centimetres

Product Information

The Air Force was mildly interested but demanded a much larger vehicle, far larger than the original concepts, which NASA accepted since it was also beneficial to their own plans. The Johnson authors’ value of 1 in 100 000 implied, as Feynman spelled out, that “one could put a Shuttle up each day for 300 years expecting to lose only one. Amid such political unpopularity, which threatened the program’s very existence, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality,” said Adelbert Tischler, retired NASA director of launch vehicles and propulsion.

Models | 3D Resources - NASA

NASA expected to carry more space flight participants as payload specialists, so designed the vehicle to carry more. Grey estimated that spares of the crucial modules might add another 10 percent to the space station’s cost. This article first appeared in print in June 1989 as part of the special report “Managing Risk In Large Complex Systems” under the title “The space shuttle: a case of subjective engineering. On one procedural flow chart, the report noted, “the ‘Hazard Analysis As Required ’ is a dead-end box with inputs but no output with respect to waiver approval decisions. The final design which was selected as a winged orbiter with three liquid-fueled engines, a large expendable external tank which held liquid propellant for these engines, and two reusable solid rocket boosters.

Instead, a partially (not fully) reusable design was selected, where an external propellant tank was discarded for each launch, and the booster rockets and shuttle orbiter were refurbished for reuse. In addition, Rodney noted, “For everyone in NASA that’s a big PRA [probabilistic risk assessment] seller, I can find you 10 that are equally convinced that PRA is oversold… [They] are so dubious of its importance that they won ’t convince themselves that the end product is worthwhile. When the NASA Administrator was presented with the results, he felt that if made public, “the numbers could do irreparable harm, and he disbanded the effort,” Cohen said. Lessons learned: in design, to use probabilistic risk assessment more in evaluating and assigning priorities to risks; in operation, to establish certain launch commit criteria that cannot be waived by anyone.

Space Shuttle Models - Hobbylinc Space Shuttle Models - Hobbylinc

If you lost the shuttle with the logistics module, you don ’t have a spare, and you can ’t build one in eight months,” Grey said, “so you may lose not only that one payload, but also whatever was put up there earlier. At the start of the space shuttle’s design, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration defined risk as “the chance (qualitative) of loss of personnel capability, toss of system, or damage to or loss of equipment or property. According to George Rodney, NASA’s associate administrator of safety, reliability, maintain­ability and quality assurance, it is not hard to get time and cycle data, “but it’s expensive and a big bookkeeping problem.Before the Apollo 11 Moon landing in 1969, NASA began studies of Space Shuttle designs as early as October 1968.

Space Shuttle design process - Wikipedia Space Shuttle design process - Wikipedia

Statistics don’t count for anything,” declared Will Willoughby, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s former head of reliability and safety during the Apollo moon landing program. In turn, by serving Air Force needs, the Shuttle became a truly national system, carrying all military as well as civilian payloads. By 1970 the shuttle had been selected as the one major project for the short-term post-Apollo time frame. NASA is apprehensive that Congress might cancel the entire program”— and so is trying to trim costs as much as possible.While a liquid-fueled booster design provided better performance, lower per-flight costs, less environmental impact and less developmental risk, solid boosters were seen as requiring less funding to develop at a time when the Shuttle program had many different elements competing for limited development funds. Those figures frighten some observers because of the dire con­sequences of losing part of the space station. By the late 1960s and early 1970s the space shuttle was being portrayed as a reusable airliner capable of carrying 15-ton payloads into orbit and 5-ton payloads back to earth. In space and aviation systems, the cost is closely related to mass, so this meant the overall vehicle cost would be very high.