From the legendary tales of the Trojan War up to the conquest of Persia by Alexander the Great, warfare played a central role in ancient Greek history and society. This module allows you to examine ancient Greek warfare from a range of different sources and angles (military, political, social, economic, cultural, and religious), to work with written and material evidence from the Classical Greek period in particular, and to assess the preliminaries, events, and conclusions of major wars, as well as studying the wider impact of warfare on ancient Greek society. Best, Jan G. P., Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on the Greek Warfare, Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1969. Echeverría, Fernando, "Hoplite and Phalanx in Archaic and Classical Greece: A Reassessment", Classical Philology, Vol. 107, No. 4, 2012, pp. 291-318. Bridges, Emma et al. eds. (2007). Cultural Responses to the Persian Wars: Antiquity to the Third Millennium. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

In 'Early Greek warfare' Rawlings turns to the conduct of war, the topic of the rest of the book. He discusses the scanty evidence for the nature of Bronze-Age warfare and highlights the symbolic functions of chariots, walls, and even swords (pp. 21-3). He then turns to Homer's depiction of war, which, following Hans van Wees, he takes to be largely contemporary and coherent, rather than an amalgam of practices from different time periods (pp. 36-7). (1) He also endorses van Wees's position that the fighting in Homer was 'a more fluid and realistic affair than many commentators have realized' (p. 37). When all of these rituals were out of the way, fighting could commence but even then it was routine to patiently wait for the enemy to assemble on a suitable plain nearby. Songs were sung (the paian - a hymn to Apollo) and both sides would advance to meet each other. However, this gentlemanly approach in time gave way to more subtle battle arrangements where surprise and strategy came to the fore. What is more, conflicts also became more diverse in the Classical period with sieges and ambushes, and urban fighting becoming more common, for example at Solygeia in 425 BCE when Athenian and Corinthian hoplites fought house to house.

The short duration of conflicts in the Greek world was often because of the poor logistics supplying and maintaining the army in the field. Soldiers were usually expected to provide their own rations (dried fish and barley porridge being most common) and the standard for Athens was three-days' worth. Most hoplites would have been accompanied by a slave acting as a baggage porter ( skeuophoroi) carrying the rations in a basket ( gylion) along with bedding and a cooking pot. Slaves also acted as attendants to the wounded as only the Spartan army had a dedicated medical officer ( iatroi). Fighting was usually in the summer so tents were rarely needed and even food could be pillaged if the fighting was in enemy territory. Towards the end of the Classical Period, armies could be resupplied by ship and larger equipment could be transported using wagons and mules which came under the responsibility of men too old to fight. Spoils of Victory Having successfully completed this module, you will be able to demonstrate knowledge and understanding of: Miller, Margaret C. (1997). Athens and Persia in the Fifth Century BC. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sabin, Philip et al. eds. (2007). The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, 2 vols.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Raaflaub, Kurt and Rosenstein, Nathan. eds. (1999). War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Even more important, it is in the conclusion that Rawlings most explicitly situates his overall approach within the two different grand schemes of the development of Greek warfare that have dominated scholarship of the last few decades. Rather than accepting the view, popular since the late 1980s, that posits a breakdown of the 'hoplite contest' in the 5th century, Rawlings is sceptical that there every were anything but practical limits on the intensity of Greek warfare: '[The Greeks] were limited only by their capacity to organize themselves ... From Agamemnon to Alexander, the evidence suggests that at no time were the Greeks ever constrained by a sense of agonism to conduct their wars in a fair and sportsmanlike fashion' (p. 226). To explain the increased intensity of warfare in the classical period, Rawlings follows the work of Hans van Wees and emphasises the crucial role of social organisation, in particular the growth of the state (pp. 224-5).

Bibliography

The Greek forces had/have mostly peacekeeping, humanitarian, logistics, reconstruction and support role.

Casson, Lionel. 1991. The Ancient Mariners: Seafarers and Sea Fighters of the Mediterranean in Ancient Times, 89-96. Princeton: Princeton University Press.*Connolly, Peter, Greece and Rome at War, London: Greenhill Books, 1998. The history of the Classical fifth century BC was dominated by two wars: the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian War. Culminating in the battles of Marathon, Thermopylae, and Salamis, the Persian Wars and their commemoration loomed large in Greek history and culture for many centuries. They contributed to the self-definition of Greeks vs. others; led to the rise of the Athenian Empire; and Alexander the Great would later set out on his conquest as a Greek war of revenge against the Persians. The Peloponnesian War, on the other hand, centred on the conflict between two Greek city-states, Athens and Sparta. Their lengthy period of strife reshaped the balance of power in the ancient Greek world, and led to the downfall of the Athenian empire. Warfare occurred throughout the history of Ancient Greece, from the Greek Dark Ages onward. The Greek 'Dark Ages' drew to an end as a significant increase in population allowed urbanized culture to be restored, whichThe phalanx was an army tactic the Greeks performed with shields. Each soldier carried a shield in his left arm, which he used to protect both himself and the man on his left. [28] The depth of the phalanx differed depending on the battle and commander, but the width of the formation was considerably greater than its depth. [29] For example, during the battle of Syracuse, the depth of the Athenian army's phalanx was 8 men, while its opponent, the Syracusan army, had a depth of 16 men. [30] Melee [ edit ] A long chapter on 'War and the economy' covers four main topics. First, Rawlings considers the extent of agricultural damage an invading army could inflict. His reasonable position is that earlier claims of long-term damage are probably exaggerated - as argued by Hanson (3) - but that even the threat of 'short-term famine' could explain why cities often decided to fight to defend their farms (p. 148). He next shows the importance, both material and psychological, of acquisition in war - mainly plunder of various forms including slaves. Again the exertion of state control limited but did not eliminate the ability of soldiers and generals to profit individually from war. A short section considers the economic role of arms production including shipbuilding; given scholarly neglect of this subject even this brief foray is praiseworthy. His final section focuses on the way that wars were financed. He argues for the 'monetarisation of war' in the classical period (p. 160); the market in mercenaries is but the most obvious sign of this. Tactically, Phillip absorbed the lessons of centuries of warfare in Greece. He echoed the tactics of Epaminondas at Chaeronea, by not engaging his right wing against the Thebans until his left wing had routed the Athenians; thus in course outnumbering and outflanking the Thebans, and securing victory. Alexander's fame is in no small part due to his success as a battlefield tactician; the unorthodox gambits he used at the battles of Issus and Gaugamela were unlike anything seen in Ancient Greece before. Another naval tactic used by the ancient Greeks was the periplous. The periplous consisted of the Greek navy "sailing around" the enemy's line. [16] Like the diekplous, the periplous' purpose was to expose the enemy's stern for an easy ramming target. [17] An example of this tactic is described by Thucydides during the second battle between the Athenians and Peloponnesians in the Gulf of Corinth. During this engagement, a single Athenian galley was being pursued by a Peloponnesian ship until the Athenian ship circled around a merchant ship and rammed the Peloponnesian vessel and sank it. [18] The Athenian ship was successful in this maneuver because it was the faster of the two ships, which is a key element in the periplous. [19] Olympias, a reconstruction of an ancient Athenian trireme, with bronze bow ram Ramming [ edit ] The Peloponnesian War (460–404 BC) saw Sparta and Athens squaring up for a clash that changed the course of history. The war can be divided into three stages: the first a 10-year series of inconclusive clashes; the second, a six-year truce. Yet there was nothing inconclusive about the third phase. In 405 BC the Spartan general Lysander defeated the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami, leading to Athens’ surrender. Sparta was now the undisputed top dog in the region.