Weiten, W.; McCann, D. (2007). Themes and Variations. Nelson Education ltd: Thomson Wadsworth. ISBN 978-0176472733. a b c Hill, Gillian; Kemp, Shelly M. (2016-02-01). "Uh-Oh! What Have We Missed? A Qualitative Investigation into Everyday Insight Experience" (PDF). The Journal of Creative Behavior. 52 (3): 201–211. doi: 10.1002/jocb.142. ISSN 2162-6057. a b c Gilhooly, K.J.; Murphy, P. (1 August 2005). "Differentiating insight from non-insight problems". Thinking & Reasoning. 11 (3): 279–302. doi: 10.1080/13546780442000187. S2CID 144379831. Salvi, Carola; Bricolo, Emanuela; Franconeri, Steven; Kounios, John; Beeman, Mark (December 2015). "Sudden insight is associated with shutting out visual inputs". Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 22 (6): 1814–1819. doi: 10.3758/s13423-015-0845-0. PMID 26268431. Two clusters of problems, those solvable by insight and those not requiring insight to solve, have been observed. [12] A person's cognitive flexibility, fluency, and vocabulary ability are predictive of performance on insight problems, but not on non-insight problems. [12] In contrast, fluid intelligence is mildly predictive of performance on non-insight problems, but not on insight problems. [12] More recent research suggests that rather than insight versus search [ clarification needed], that the subjective feeling of insight varies, with some solutions experienced with a stronger feeling of Aha than others. [13] Emotion [ edit ]

the power of acute observation and deduction, discernment, and perception, called intellection or noesis The authors are funded by the WWTF Project CS18-023 and START project Y 01309 by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) to AA. Conflict of Interest In an attempt to find a bridge between the strengths of both previous theories, Weisberg proposed an integrated theory of insight comprising several phases: the individual would first attempt to find a solution by using strategies based on long-term memory; if this fails, the subject would use rules of thumb or more complex heuristics to acquire information about the problem before re-confronting its long-term memory; then, a conscious solution via a restructuring of old and new information may thereby be achieved; and if the process reaches an impasse and new information is no longer acquired, an unconscious restructuration of knowledge would take place ( Weisberg, 2015). Interestingly, the four stages of Weisberg's (2015) proposal bear some parallels to those suggested by Wallas in the mid twentieth century ( Wallas, 1926). “Preparation” would comprise the first three phases of the integrated insight theory, while “incubation” and “illumination” could be interpreted as part of the fourth, where insight is achieved through an unconscious process (see above, section four, to find Wallas’ proposal). Fixation and Impasse Ghaemi, S.Nassir (2002). Polypharmacy in Psychiatry. Hoboken: Informa Healthcare. ISBN 978-0-8247-0776-7.

Even the “aha” moment itself might be accessible to study in non-verbal subjects, given the expected physiological emotional response that follows it. We know that many animals show an emotional response while learning how to solve tasks (independent from the presence of a reward; e.g., cows, Hagen and Broom, 2004; goats, Langbein et al., 2004; horses, Mengoli et al., 2014; dogs, McGowan et al., 2014; dolphins, Clark et al., 2013). Studying insight through the presentation of a solution would thus require both a behavioral analysis (as in traditional contrafreeloading tests or yoked experimental designs; e.g., Hagen and Broom, 2004; Rosenberger et al., 2020) as well as a physiological one. Artificially altering the transparency of the path toward the solution, and altering the time spent at an apparent impasse, may allow us to predict and modify the intensity of the respective physiological (as it would be an increased heart rate; Hill and Kemp, 2018) and behavioral responses (e.g., in dogs, we would predict pupil dilation, tail wagging, and increased general activity; McGowan et al., 2014; Webb et al., 2019; Salvi et al., 2020). Conclusion Shen, W.; Yuan, Y.; Liu, C.; etal. (2015). "In search of the 'Aha!' experience: Elucidating the emotionality of insight problem-solving". British Journal of Psychology. 107 (2): 281–298. doi: 10.1111/bjop.12142. PMID 26184903.

a b Metcalfe, Janet; Wiebe, David (1987). "Intuition in insight and noninsight problem solving". Memory & Cognition. 15 (3): 238–246. doi: 10.3758/BF03197722. PMID 3600264. Model reduction occurs neither only during sleep, nor only in humans. Rats that move away from exploratory or spatial foraging behavior, and enter short periods of rest, have been found to have hippocampal activity similar to what we would expect in models undergoing insight-compatible changes ( Gupta et al., 2010; Pezzulo et al., 2014; Friston et al., 2017). Internally generated sequences (sequences of multi-neuron firing activity that do not reflect an ongoing behavioral sequence) seem to be able to restructure models, not only consolidating memory but also exploring potential solutions ( Pezzulo et al., 2014). The Eureka Experience a b c d Lin, Wei-Lun; Hsu, Kung-Yu; Chen, Hsueh-Chih; etal. (2011). "The relations of gender and personality traits on different creativities: A dual-process theory account". Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts. 6 (2): 112–123. doi: 10.1037/a0026241. S2CID 55632785. Hadamard, Jacques (1954) [1945]. An essay on the psychology of invention in the mathematical field. New York, N.Y.: Dover Publ. LCCN 54-4731. Insight is a measurable phenomenon in humans, and the mechanisms by which it occurs may well be accessible to species other than our own. Thanks to recent progress in neuroscience and human psychology, we are beginning to clarify the (in some cases subtle) differences that distinguish insight problem solving from other processes. Comparative cognition, however, has so far been limited in its approach. Performance-based setups using technical problems in both birds and mammals have produced highly interesting and suggestive, yet, ambivalent evidence on animal insight (e.g., Heinrich, 1995; Mendes et al., 2007; Bird and Emery, 2009a, b; Laumer et al., 2017, 2018; von Bayern et al., 2018). We are optimistic that accomplishments in neuroscience and human psychology over the past decade can be incorporated into and inspire future comparative cognition studies in their ongoing quest to learn about the capacity for insight in species other than our own. Author ContributionsGiven the importance of the subjectively perceived components of insight, the phenomenon is certainly easier to study in humans than in non-human animals, both because of the possibility to report verbally (the subject might describe the suddenness of the solution’s appearance and the emotions involved, but also specific difficulties with aspects of the task, and how close the subject believes he or she is to the solution at any given moment) and the methodology (because of test diversity and the relative ease of applying neuroimaging technology). Ren, Jun; Huang, ZhiHui; Luo, Jing; etal. (29 October 2011). "Meditation promotes insightful problem-solving by keeping people in a mindful and alert conscious state". Science China Life Sciences. 54 (10): 961–965. doi: 10.1007/s11427-011-4233-3. PMID 22038009. While neurobiology and cognitive psychology embrace insightful solutions achieved by associations learned in the past, comparative cognition tends to exclude associative learning from its notion of insight, which is a misconception as insight can occur through distant or weak associations ( Shettleworth, 2012; Call, 2013). In comparative cognition, insight has occasionally been used as a default explanation upon failing to detect the typical gradual process of associative learning. Marková, I. S.; Berrios, G. E.; Hodges, J. H. (2004). "Insight into Memory Function". Neurology, Psychiatry & Brain Research. 11: 115–126. Human neuroimaging and electrophysiology-based studies suggest a significant function of the prefrontal cortex in the process of overcoming impasse to reach incubation (e.g., Qiu et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2013; Seyed-Allaei et al., 2017; Shen et al., 2018). The right inferior frontal gyrus plays a role in evaluating possible solutions while the left gyrus seems to control the suppression of inappropriate mental sets or dominantly activated associations (e.g., Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Shen et al., 2013, 2018; Wu et al., 2015). This corresponds with studies reporting brain asymmetries in insight tests. Studies using insight and priming with word hints (where the left hemisphere typically has an advantage; van Steenburgh et al., 2012), the left visual field (right hemisphere) has shown a strong advantage over the right, with primed participants finding more solutions faster ( Bowden and Beeman, 1998; Beeman and Bowden, 2000).